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a b s t r a c t
Today’s Golden Age of computer forensics is quickly coming to an end. Without a clear
strategy for enabling research efforts that build upon one another, forensic research will
fall behind the market, tools will become increasingly obsolete, and law enforcement,
military and other users of computer forensics products will be unable to rely on the results
of forensic analysis. This article summarizes current forensic research directions and
argues that to move forward the community needs to adopt standardized, modular
approaches for data representation and forensic processing.
ª 2010 Digital Forensic Research Workshop. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Digital Forensics (DF) has grown from a relatively obscure
tradecraft to an important part of many investigations. DF
tools are now used on a daily basis by examiners and analysts
within local, state and Federal law enforcement; within the
military and other US government organizations; and within
the private “e-Discovery” industry. Developments in forensic
research, tools, and process over the past decade have been
very successful and many in leadership positions now rely on
these tools on a regular basisdfrequently without realizing it.
Moreover, there seems to be a widespread belief, buttressed
on by portrayals in the popular media, that advanced tools
and skillful practitioners can extract actionable information
frompractically any device that a government, private agency,
or even a skillful individual might encounter.
This paper argues that we have been in a “Golden Age of
Digital Forensics,” and that the Golden Age is quickly coming
to an end. Increasingly organizations encounter data that
cannot be analyzed with today’s tools because of format
incompatibilities, encryption, or simply a lack of training.
Even data that can be analyzed can wait weeks or months
before review because of data management issues. Without
a clear research agenda aimed at dramatically improving the
efficiency of both our tools and our very research process, our
hard-won capabilities will be degraded and eventually lost in
the coming years.
This paper proposes a plan for achieving that dramatic
improvement in research and operational efficiency through
the adoption of systematic approaches for representing
forensic data and performing forensic computation. It draws
on more than 15 years personal experience in computer
forensics, an extensive review of the DF research literature,
and dozens of discussions with practitioners in government,
industry, and the international forensics community.
1.1. Prior and related work
Although there has been some work in the DF community to
create common file formats, schemas and ontologies, there
has been little actual standardization. DFRWS started the
Common Digital Evidence Storage Format (CDESF) Working
Group in 2006. The group created a survey of disk image
storage formats in September 2006, but then disbanded in
August 2007 “because DFRWS did not have the resources
required to achieve the goals of the group. (CDESF working
group, 2009)” Hoss and Carver discuss ontologies to support
digital forensics (Carver and Hoss, 2009), but did not propose
any concrete ontologies that can be used. Garfinkel introduced
an XML representation for file system metadata (Garfinkel,
2009), but it has not been widely adopted.
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Richard and Roussev reviewed requirements for “Next-
generation digital forensics.” Their work stressed system
requirements, and argued that inefficient system design,
wasted CPU cycles, and the failure to deploy distributing
computing techniques is introducing significant and unnec-
essary delays that directly translate into unnecessary delays
(Richard and Roussev, 2006). Elements of a modular computer
forensics systemexist in bothCorey et al.’s design of a network
forensics analysis tool (Corey et al., 2002) and inCohen’s PyFlag
(Cohen, 2008), although the rest of the DF research community
has generally failed to appreciate how these architectures can
satisfy Richard and Roussev’s requirement for parallelism.
Ayers ignored all of the previous work on this topic in his
“second generation computer forensic analysis system,” pre-
sented at DFRWS 2009 (Ayers, 2005). In general, it seems that
very few DF systems designers build upon previous workd
instead, each new project starts afresh.
Following the first DFRWS, Mocas proposed a framework to
help build “theoretical underpinnings for digital forensics
research (Mocas, 2004).” The purpose of the framework was to
“define a set of properties and terms that can be used as
organizing principles for the development and evaluation of
research in digital forensics.” Mocas suggested that research
should consider context in which evidence is encountered,
data integrity, authentication, reproducibility, non-interfer-
ence and the ability of proposed techniques to comply with
federal minimization requirements.
Pollitt reviewed 14 different models for digital forensics
investigation but did not attempt to evaluate or catalog them
given time constraints (Pollitt, 2007). Most of these investiga-
tion models rely on the ability to make the best use of digital
evidence that is found. An alternative approach is proactive
digital forensicsdfor example, Ray et al.’s design for a system
that predicts attacks and changes its collection behavior before
an attack takes place (Allen Ray, 2007). Bradford et al. likewise
argue that it is unwise to depend upon “audit trails and
internal logs” and the digital forensics will only be possible on
future systems if those systemsmake proactive efforts at data
collection and preservation; they present a mathematical
model for deciding the content and frequency of proactive
forensic event recorders (Bradford et al., 2004).
Pollitt et al. discussed how virtualization software and
techniques can be productively applied to both digital foren-
sics research and education (Pollitt et al., 2008). Any discus-
sion of virtualization with respect to digital forensics faces an
unwelcome tautology. In practice, the impact of virtualization
on forensic examination can usually be ignoreddexceptwhen
it can’t. That’s because sometimes the virtualization is the
subject of the forensic examination, and sometimes the vir-
tualization is a tool it is used by the forensic examiner.
In June 2008 a brainstorming session at CISSE 2008
explored research categories, topics and problems in digital
forensics. One of the results of this project was an article by
Nance, Hay and Bishop that attempted to define a Digital
Forensics Research Agenda (Nance et al., 2009). The authors
identified six categories for digital forensics research:
Evidence Modeling, Network Forensics, Data Volume, Live
Acquisition, Media Types, and Control Systems. This
taxonomy is useful, but believe that the tactical analysis must
be accompanied by strategic thinking.
In January 2009 Beebe presented an invited talk at the Fifth
IFIP WG 11.9 International Conference on Digital Forensics
entitled “Digital Forensics: The Good, The Bad, and the
Unaddressed (Beebe, 2009).” Beebe argued convincingly that
digital forensics was no longer a niche discipline. “It is now
mainstream knowledge that the digital footprints that remain
after interactions with computers and networks are signifi-
cant and probative. Digital forensics was once a niche science
that was leveraged primarily in support of criminal investi-
gations, and digital forensic services were utilized only during
the late stages of investigations after much of the digital
evidence was already spoiled. Now digital forensic services
are sought right at the beginning of all types of inves-
tigations.Even popular crime shows and novels regularly
incorporate digital evidence in their story lines.”
As far as “The Bad” and “TheUnaddressed,” Beebe said that
digital forensics largely lacks standardization and process,
andwhat little widespread knowledge thatwe have is “heavily
biased towards Windows, and to a lesser extent, standard
Linux distributions.” Unaddressed, Beebe says, is the problem
of scalability, the lack of intelligent analytics beyond full-text
search, non-standard computing devices (especially small
devices), ease-of-use, and a laundry list of unmet technical
challenges.
Finally, Turnbull et al. performed a detailed analysis on the
specific digital media formats being collected by the South
Australian Police Electronic Crime Section; theirs appears to
be the first quantitative analysis of its kind (Turnbull et al.,
2009), although the FBI’s Regional Computer Forensic Labo-
ratory programpublishes an annual reportwith the amount of
media and cases that it processes (Regional Computer
Forensics Laboratory, 2008). More case studies such as these
are needed so that researchers can use actual evidence, rather
than their own personal experiences, to direct their problem-
solving efforts.
2. Digital forensics: a brief history
Today DF is an important tool for solving crimes committed
with computers (e.g. phishing and bank fraud), as well as for
solving crimes against people where evidence may reside on
a computer (e.g. money laundering and child exploitation).
Forensic tools have also become a vital tool for Information
Assurance because of their ability to reconstruct the evidence
left by cyber attacks.
2.1. The early days
DF is roughly forty years old. What we now consider forensic
techniques were developed primarily for data recovery. For
example, Wood et al. relate a story about two local data
recovery experts working for 70 h to recover the only copy of
a highly fragmented database file inadvertently erased by
a careless researcher (pp.123e124 Wood et al., 1987). By the
late 1980s utilities were being widely advertised that could
perform a variety of data recovering, including “Unformat,
Undelete, Diagnose & Remedy”(p.57 Display ad 57, 1987).
These early days were marked by:
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 Hardware, software, and application diversity.
 A proliferation of data file formats, many of which were
poorly documented.
 Heavy reliance on time-sharing and centralized computing
facilities; rarely was there significant storage in the home of
either users or perpetrators that required analysis.
 The absence of formal process, tools, and training.
In these early days forensics was largely performed by
computer professionalswhoworkedwith law enforcement on
an ad hoc, case-by-case basis. Astronomer Cliff Stoll’s foray
into network forensics was one of the most celebrated
examples of the time (Stoll, 1988, 1990).
There was also a limited need to perform DF. Evidence left
on time sharing systems frequently could be recovered
without the use of recovery tools. And because disks were
small, many perpetrators made extensive printouts. As
a result, few cases required analysis of digital media. The FBI
started a “Magnetic Media Program” in 1984, but only per-
formed examinations in three cases during its first year
(CVJCTS, 2004).
Computer hacking was in the popular consciousness, as
evidenced by the 1983 movie “WarGames.” But prior to the
passage of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984,
computer hacking was not even a crime, further limiting the
need to subject systems to forensic analysis.
2.2. The Golden Age of digital forensics
The years from 1999e2007 were a kind of “Golden Age” for
digital forensics. During this time digital forensics became
a kind of magic window that could see into the past (through
the recovery of residual data that was thought to have been
deleted) and into the criminal mind (through the recovery of
email and instant messages). Network and memory forensics
made it possible to freeze time and observe crimes as they
were being committeddeven many months after the fact.
Forensics became so widespread and reliable that it escaped
from the lab and onto the TV screen, creating the so-called
“CSI Effect.” (Shelton, 2008)
This Golden Age was characterized by:
 The widespread use of Microsoft Windows, and specifically
Windows XP.
 Relatively few file formats of forensic interestdmostly
Microsoft Office for documents, JPEG for digital photo-
graphs; and AVI and WMV for video.
 Examinations largely confined to a single computer system
belonging to the subject of the investigation.
 Storage devices equipped with standard interfaces (IDE/
ATA), attached using removable cables and connectors, and
secured with removable screws.
 Multiple vendors selling tools that were reasonably good at
recovering allocated and deleted files.
The widespread dominance of the so-called “WinTel” plat-
form meant that many digital forensics examiners could be
successful knowing that systemandnoothers. Thewidespread
failure of the market to adopt encryption technology for data-
at-rest (Garfinkel and Shelat, 2002) made it relatively easy to
develop and sell forensic tools that were actually useful to
a wide range of customers. These tools allowed someone with
relatively limited training to search for emailmessages, recover
deleted files and perform basic file carving.
The Golden Age was also marked by a rapid growth in
digital forensics research and professionalization. Universi-
ties around the world started offering courses in DF. Today
there are 14 schools offering certificate programs in DF, 5
schools offering associates degrees, 16 bachelor programs, 13
masters programs, and two doctoral programs, according to
the Digital Forensics Association (2010).
2.3. The coming digital forensics crisis
Today much of the last decade’s progress is quickly becoming
irrelevant. Digital Forensics is facing a crisis. Hard-won
capabilities are in jeopardy of being diminished or even lost as
the result of advances and fundamental changes in the
computer industry:
 The growing size of storage devices means that there is
frequently insufficient time to create a forensic image of
a subject device, or to process all of the data once it is found.
 The increasing prevalence of embedded flash storage and
the proliferation of hardware interfaces means that storage
devices can no longer be readily removed or imaged.
 The proliferation of operating systems and file formats is
dramatically increasing the requirements and complexity of
data exploitation tools and the cost of tool development.
 Whereas cases were previously limited to the analysis of
a single device, increasingly cases require the analysis of
multiple devices followed by the correlation of the found
evidence.
 Pervasive encryption (Casey and Stellatos, 2008) means that
even when data can be recovered, it frequently cannot be
processed.
 Use of the “cloud” for remote processing and storage, and to
split a single data structure into elements, means that
frequently data or code cannot even be found.
 Malware that is not written to persistent storage necessi-
tates the need for expensive RAM forensics.
 Legal challenges increasingly limit the scope of forensic
investigations.
Today’s examiners frequently cannot obtain data in
a forensically sound manner or process that data to comple-
tion once they obtain it. Evidence, especially exculpatory
evidence, may be routinely missed.
These problems are most obvious to examiners faced with
cell phones and other mobile computing platforms. There are
thousands of cell phonemodels in use around the world, with
five major operating systems (Android, Apple, Blackberry,
Windows Mobile, Symbian), more than a dozen “proprietary”
systems, and more than 100,000 downloadable applications.
There are dozens of “standard” cell-phone connectors and
chargers.
It is vital for forensics examiners to be able to extract data
from cell phones in a principledmanner, asmobile phones are
a primary tool of criminals and terrorists. But there is no
standard way to extract information from cell phones. While
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some manufacturers are rumored to provide assistance to
some law enforcement organizations, in many cases it is
impractical to involve manufactures due to time, cost, or
security concerns. The NIST Guidelines on Cell Phone Forensics
recommends “searching Internet sites for developer, hacker,
and security exploit information” when confronting a cell
phone that is password-protected (National Institute of
Standards and Technology, 2007).
Similar problems with diversity and data extraction exist
with telecommunications equipment, video game consoles
and even eBook readers. These last two pose the additional
problem that techniques used by to protect their intellectual
property also make these systems resistant to forensic anal-
ysis. Yet all of these systems have been used as the instru-
ment of crimes and may contain information vital to
investigations.
Our inability to extract information from devices in a clean
and repeatable manner also means that we are unable to
analyze these devices for malware or Trojan horses. For
example, the persistent memory inside GPUs, RAID control-
lers, network interfaces, and power-management co-proces-
sors is routinely ignored during forensic investigations, even
though it can be utilized by attackers.
The vast size of today’s storage devices means that time-
honored and court-approved techniques for conducting
investigations are becoming slower and more expensive.
Today a 2TB hard drive can be purchased for $120 but takes
more than 7 h to image; systems and individuals of interest
can easily have more storage than the police crime lab
responsible for performing the analysis.
Encryption and cloud computing both threaten forensic
visibilitydand both in much the same way. No matter
whether critical information is stored in an unidentified
server “somewhere in the cloud” or stored on the subject’s
hard drive inside a TrueCrypt volume, these technologies
deny investigators access to the case data. While neither
technology is invincible, both require time and frequently luck
to circumvent (Casey and Stellatos, 2008). Cloud computing in
particular may make it impossible to perform basic forensic
steps of data preservation and isolation on systems of forensic
interest.
In recent years there has been substantial interest in
RAM-based forensics to defeat encryption and to find mal-
ware that is not written to persistent storage. RAM forensics
can capture the current state of a machine in a way that is
not possible using disk analysis alone. But RAM DF tools are
dramatically more difficult to create than disk tools. Unlike
information written to disk, which is stored with the
intention that it will be read back in the futuredpossibly by
a different programdinformation in RAM is only intended
to be read by the running program. As a result there is less
reason for programmers to document data structures or
conserve data layout from one version of a program to
another. Both factors greatly complicate the task of the tool
developer, which increases tool cost and limits
functionality.
Although the market for DF tools appears to be growing, it
continues to be dominated by relatively small companies that
face extraordinarily high research-and-development costs.
Product lifetimes are short because new developments in the
marketplace must be tracked and integrated into tools, or else
the tools become rapidly obsolete. A few commercial players
heroically struggle to keep their products up-to-date, but their
coverage of the digital systems in use today is necessarily
incomplete.
Among digital forensics professionals, the best approach
for solving the coverage problem is to buy one of every tool on the
market. Clearly, this approach only works for well-funded
organizations. Even then, there are many situations in which
commercial tools fail and practitioners must rely on open
source software. Although some of this software is very good,
other tools are poorly documented, out-of-date, and even
abandoned. Sadly, even though many professionals rely on
open source tools, there is no recognized or funded clearing
house for open source forensics software.
Training is a serious problem facing organizations that
deliver forensic services. There is a lack of complex, realistic
training data, which means that most classes are taught with
either simplistic manufactured data or else live data. Live data
cannot be shared between institutions, resulting in dramati-
cally higher costs for the preparation of instructionalmaterial.
As a result, many organizations report that it typically takes
between one and two years of on-the-job training before
a newly minted forensics examiner is proficient enough to
lead an investigation.
Lastly, a variety of legal challenges are combining to make
the very process of computer forensics more complicated,
time consuming, and expensive. In US v. Comprehensive
Drug Testing (Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc, 2009) the
Court wrote dicta that ran counter to decades of digital
forensics practice and has dramatically limited the scope of
federal warrant searches. Equally problematic is the inter-
national landscape. In the two decades since Stoll discovered
the difficulty of executing an international wiretap order
(Stoll, 1988), US law enforcement organizations have made
significant strides in their ability to work with their foreign
counterparts (Cerezo et al., 2007). Nevertheless, recent
attempts by academics to unravel the economics and tech-
nology of large-scale botnets indicate that cyber-criminals
remain the masters of international cooperation (Kanich
et al., 2009).
Fortunately, the capabilities of DF rose to such great
heights during the Golden Age that we have a long way to fall
before DF becomes useless. After explaining why current
approaches to DF research are not up to the task (Section 3),
this paper proposes a newway for the research community to
move forward (Section 4).
3. Today’s research challenges
This section describes the landscape of today’s computer
forensic research activities. It starts with a discussion of the
driving factors for today’s computer forensic tools. It then
discusses the “visibility and search” model employed by
today’s forensic tools. It finally argues that much of this
resulting research is tactical reverse engineering that poorly
integrates with existing tools and fails to create new
models that could ultimately lower the cost of forensic
research.
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3.1. Evidence-oriented design
There are two fundamental problems with the design of
today’s computer forensic tools:
 Today’s tools were designed to help examiners find specific
pieces of evidence, not to assist in investigations.
 Today’s tools were created for solving crimes committed
against people where the evidence resides on a computer;
they were not created to assist in solving typical crimes
committed with computers or against computers.
Put crudely, today’s tools were creating for solving child
pornography cases, not computer hacking cases. They were
created for finding evidence where the possession of evidence
is the crime itself.
As a result of this bias, today’s tools are poorly suited to
finding information that is out-of-the-ordinary, out-of-place,
or subtly modified. Today’s tools can (sometimes) work with
a case that contains several terabytes of data, but they cannot
assemble terabytes of data into a concise report. It is difficult
to use these tools to reconstruct a unified timeline of past
events or the actions of a perpetrator. Such tasks are instead
performed more-or-less manually when forensic tools are
used for investigations, incident response, e-discovery, and
other purposes.
Evidence-oriented design has limited both the tools’
evolutionary path and the imagination of those guiding
today’s research efforts:
 The legitimate desire not tomiss any potential evidence has
caused developers to emphasize completeness without
concern for speed. As a result, today there are few DF tools
that can perform a useful five-minute analysis.
 The objective of producing electronic documents that can be
shown in court has stunted the development of forensic
techniques that could operate on data that is not readily
displayed. For example, despite the interest in residual
data analysis, there are no commercially available tools
that can perform useful operations on the second half of
a JPEG file. Indeed, it was only in 2009 that academics
showed it was even possible to display the second half of
a JPEG file when the first half is missing (Sencar and
Memon, 2009).
 The perceived impermissibility ofmixing evidence fromone
case with another has largely blocked the adoption of cross-
drive analysis techniques (Garfinkel, 2006), even though
cross-case searches for fingerprints and DNA evidence is
now a vital law enforcement tool.
Today’s tools must be re-imagined to facilitate investiga-
tion and exploration. This is especially important when the
tools are used outside of the law enforcement context for
activities such as cyber-defense and intelligence.
3.2. The visibility, filter and report model
Most of today’s DF tools implement the same conceptual
model for finding and displaying information. This approach
may be terms the “Visibility, Filter and Report” model.
1. All of the data on the collectedmedia is analyzed andmade
visible in a user interface. The visibility process typically
consists of four specific steps:
1.1. Data to be analyzed is viewed as a tree, with the root of
the tree being a critical data structure from which all
other data can be reached. Examples of roots include
the partition table of a disk; the root directory of a file
system; a critical structure in the kernel memory; or
a directory holding evidence files.
1.2. Starting at the root,metadata is recursively examined to
locate all data objects. Examples of data objects include
files, network streams, and application memory maps.
1.3. Information regarding each data object is stored in
a database. Some tools use in-memory databases,
while others use external SQL databases.
1.4. Some tools additionally use carving (Mikus, 2005) to
locate data objects that cannot be reached from the
root. Some tools recursively process carving results
with step 1.3, while other tools will simply instantiate
each carved object as a file that must then bemanually
processed.
2. The user is presented with a tabular display of all the data
objects. Individual data objects can be explored.
3. The user can apply filters to shorten the display.
4. The user can perform searches for keywords, names, phone
numbers, and other specific content.
5. Finally, the user generates a report about what was found
and the process followed to find it. Most modern computer
forensic tools assist with some aspect of the report writing.
This model closely follows the tasks are required for
evidence-oriented design (Section 3.1). For example, themodel
allows the analyst to search for a specific email address, but
does not provide tools for extracting and prioritizing all email
addresses that may be present. Because files are recovered
before they are analyzed, certain kinds of forensic analysis are
significantly more computationally expensive than they
would be with other models. While some processes can be
automated using scripting facilities, automation comes only at
great expenses and has had limited success. Finally, this
model does not readily lend itself to parallel processing. As
a result, ingest delays are increasing with each passing year.
3.3. The difficulty of reverse engineering
Many of today’s DF engineering resources are dedicated to
reverse engineering hardware and software artifacts that
have been developed by the global IT economy and sold
without restrictions into the marketplace. But despite the
resources being expended, researchers lack a systematic
approach to reverse engineering. There is no standard set of
tools or procedure. There is little automation. As a result, each
project is a stand-alone endeavor, and the results of one
project generally cannot exchange data or high-level pro-
cessing with other tools in today’s forensic kit.
3.4. Monolithic applications
There is a strong incentive among a few specific vendors to
deploy their research results within the context of all-in-one
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forensic suites or applications. These vendors largely eschew
the tools-based philosophy of Unix and have instead opted to
create applications that resembles Microsoft Office. This
approach may simplify user training and promote product
lock-in, but it also increases costs for the field as a whole.
Support for file systems, data formats, and cryptographic
schemes is a competitive advantage for vendors and devel-
opment teams. But when these capabilities are bundled into
a single application it is not possible for end-users to easily
mix-and-match these capabilities as operational require-
ments dictate.
3.5. Lost academic research
A considerable amount of digital forensics research world-
wide is being performed at universities and funded by various
organizations at the state and national level. The National
Science Foundation, the National Institute of Justice and the
National Institute of Standards and Technology have all fun-
ded digital forensics research. Several conferences and jour-
nals exist to publish the results of this work. Many forensic
programs have thesis requirements, creating yet more
research and potentially useful tools.
Yet despite this frenzy of forensic activity, there are rela-
tively few cases of academic research being successfully
transitioned to end users:
1. Academic researchers can distribute open source tools that
can be directly used, but most end users lack the skills to
download tools and use them.
2. Academic researchers can license their technology to
a vendor, which then either sells the technology directly or
incorporates it into an existing tool. It is difficult to find an
instance of this happening.
3. Vendors can read and learn from academic papers, perhaps
creating their own parallel implementations of the work
presented. But after numerous discussions with vendors it
has become clear that they are relatively uninformed
regarding the current state of academic forensic research.
Transitioning any technology from academia to end users
is often difficult, of course. But attention to technology
transfer is especially important in forensics given the scale of
the problem, the relatively small developer community, and
the small budgets for tool development. We cannot afford to
waste the technology that academia is developing.
4. A new research direction
DF research needs to become dramatically more efficient,
better coordinated, and better funded if investigators are to
retain significant DF capabilities in the coming decade.
Faced with growing complexity, the standard tool of the
computer scientist is abstraction and modularization (Saltzer
and Frans Kaashoek, 2009). Given the staggering amount and
complexity of data faced by forensic practitioners, it would
make sense for forensic researchers or users to demand
standards for data and code interchange. The key to
improving research is the development and adoption of
standards for case data, higher-level data abstractions, and
composable models for forensic processing.
4.1. Forensic data abstraction
Today there are only five widely used forensic data
abstractions:
Disk images are archived and transferred as raw or EnCase
E01 files.
Packet capture files in bpf (McCanne and Jacobson, 1993)
format are used to distribute network intercepts.
Files are used to distribute documents and image.
File signatures are distributed as MD5 and SHA1 hashes.
Extracted Named Entities such as names, phone numbers,
email addresses, credit card numbers, etc., are distributed as
ASCII text files or, in some cases, Unicode files. Named entities
are typically used for stop lists and watch lists.
Efforts to develop new formats and abstractions have
largely failed (CDESFworking group, 2009). The DF community
specifically needs to create a wide range of abstractionsd
standardized ways for thinking about, representing, and
computing with information ranging from a few bytes to
a person’s lifetime data production. For example:
Signature metrics for representing parts of files or entire files,
including n-grams, piecewise hashes, and similarity metrics.
File metadata e.g. Microsoft Office document properties, JPEG
EXIF information, or geographical information.
File systemmetadata e.g. such as timestamps, file ownership,
and the physical location of files in a disk image.
Application profiles e.g. the collection of files that make up an
application, the Windows Registry or Macintosh plist infor-
mation associated with an application, document signatures,
and network traffic signatures.
User profiles e.g. tasks the user engages in, which applications
the user runs, when the user runs them, and forwhat purpose.
Internet and social network information associated with the
user, e.g. the collection of accounts that the user accesses, or
user’s Internet “imprint” or “footprint” (Garfinkel and Cox,
2009).
The lack of standardized abstractions and standardized
data formats slows progress by forcing researchers to imple-
ment more parts of a system before they can produce initial
results. Researchers are forced to spend more time acquiring
and preparing data. It is harder to compare research products.
And most importantly, the lack of interchange formats limits
the ability to create tools that can inter-operate.
Digital Forensics XML (Garfinkel, 2009) can be used to
interchange a wide range of forensic metadata. The XML
representation can be created by the tools fiwalk and frag_find
today, and is being considered as a “Data Carving Log” format
for PhotoRec (Grenier, 2009) as well as other carving tools.
Having both filesystem extraction tools and file carvers
produce the same XML makes it possible to create a forensic
processing pipeline that preserves semantic content while
allowing later stages of the pipeline to be insensitive to the
manner in which data is extracted by the earlier stages.
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Having a single format supported by multiple carvers also
makes it possible to cross-validate carvers, build a single
“meta” file carver that logically combines the results of
multiple carvers and carving algorithms, or perform extensive
regression tests.
SQL is another tool that can be productively used by the
forensics community. Instead of integrate through pipes and
XML files, the tools can integrate through an a SQL database.
Already some tools, such as FTK3, store case information in an
SQL database. But exploiting SQL to its potential requires the
adoption of standardized data models and schemas.
4.2. Modularization and composability
Similar to the lack of standardized data format is the lack of
a standardized architecture for forensic processing.
Today forensic software is largely developed in C, Cþþ,
Java, perl, Python, and Guidance Software’s proprietary
EnScript language. The software is run onMicrosoftWindows,
Apple Macintosh, and Linux operating systems.
Faced with such diversity of development choices, other
developer communities have created frameworks that enable
cross-language, cross-platform development. Typically these
frameworks include standardized processing models, cross-
language APIs and straightforward data marshaling. Some of
the best examples of such a framework include the Apache
webserver module system, the Mozilla Firefox web browser,
and the Eclipse development platform. No such framework
exists for processing DF information.
For example, a framework might allow plug-ins for file
systems, processing of sectors, IP packets, bytestream
“objects” (e.g. files, TCP streams and extracted contents from
archive files), timestamps, email address, proper names, and
so on. The framework could have a variety of correlation
subsystems including an object-based hierarchical store and
a temporal events database. The output subsystem could
allow any plug-in to emit structured data; this data could then
be used for textual reports, interactive reports, visualizations,
or to drive some kind of automated event system.
Plug-ins for a forensics computation framework should be
based on a callback model. This model allows for the same
plug-in to be used in single-threaded, multi-threaded, or
multi-server implementation. Although SleuthKit (Carrier,
2005) and fiwalk.py (Garfinkel, 2009) provide for limited call-
backs, their APIs need to be extended to include reporting and
forensic “meet points” for correlation. Such an API could also
allow for forensic modules to be used in both interactive and
batch forensic tools.
Today PyFlag (Cohen, 2008), OCFA (Dutch National Police
Agency, 2010) and DFF (Baguelin et al., 2010) are all examples
of frameworks. Yet none of these systems provide the scale,
hooks for experimentation, or workflow automation required
for a research framework. Such a framework would lower
research costs by allowing researchers to focus on the specific
algorithm that they were creating, rather than forcing them to
learn many details of digital forensics. A framework would
further allow the same algorithms to be deployed on small
handheld systems, multi-core desktops, large blade clusters
with hundreds or thousands of computation nodes. A stable
API, popularized by this framework, could be adopted by
commercial products such as NetIntercept (Corey et al., 2002),
EnCase (Guidance Software, 2007), and FTK (Access Data,
2005), allowing for the easy transition of technology from
the research laboratory to the user community.
As indicated above, SQL can also be used as an integration
framework. Extraction tools find forensic details and store it in
the database; visibility tools search the database and display
the results. The use of a database can also enable multi-user
forensic tools. But using a SQL database in this manner
requires more careful planning that a standardized schema.
First, the software developer must make a commitment to
store all relevant information in the database, since data
stored in the filesystem may not be visible to all applications.
Developers must preserve and maintain old fields of the
database even when they are no longer used, because a plug-
in may make use of them. SQL can also severely limit
performance.
4.3. Alternative analysis models
A logical first step in constructing a modular forensic pro-
cessing framework would be to create a system that imple-
ments the “Visibility, Filter and Report” model introduced in
Section 3.2. But a properly factored framework could then be
used to experiment with alternative processing approaches.
4.3.1. Stream-based disk forensics
An alternative processing model suggested by Roussev
(Rosusev, 2006) is to process an entire disk image as a byte-
stream, starting at the beginning and reading until the end.
This approach eliminates the time that the drive head spends
seeking and assures that no data on the disk will be left
untouched, but it can require a significant amount of RAM in
order to reconstruct the file system hierarchy or to determine
file boundaries. Of course, it may be possible to recover
a significant amount of useful information from the drive
without building the hierarchy, as previous research has
shown that most files of forensic interest are not fragmented
(Garfinkel, 2007).
Stream-based disk forensics is clearly more important for
hard drives than for SSD drives, which have no moving head
to “seek.” But even without a seek penalty, it may be compu-
tationally easier to scan themedia from beginning to end than
make a first pass for file-by-file recovery followed by a second
pass in which the unallocated sectors are examined.
4.3.2. Stochastic analysis
Yet another model for forensic processing is to sample and
process randomly chosen sections of the drive. This approach
has the advantage of potentially being very fast, but has the
disadvantage that small pieces of trace data may be missed.
4.3.3. Prioritized analysis
Prioritized analysis is a triage-oriented approach in which
forensic tasks are sequenced so that the operator will be
presented with critical information as quickly as possible.
Today the only commercial system that implements this
approach is I.D.E.A.L. Technology Corp.’s STRIKE (System for
TRIaging Key Evidence). STRIKE is a handheld forensics plat-
form designed to process digital media and display what is
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found on its touch-screen user interface as new information is
encountered (I.D.E.A.L., 2010). Unfortunately, STRIKE has not
been demonstrated widely to either academic or commercial
customers.
4.4. Scale and validation
Scale is an important issue to address early in the research
process. Today many techniques that are developed and
demonstrated on relatively small data sets (n< 100) fail when
they are scaled up to real-world sizes (n> 10,000). This is true
whether n refers to the number of JPEGs, TB, hard drives or cell
phones.
At the same time, researchers are failing to develop a range
of techniques that don’t work at a small scale but perform
quite well when run in a data-rich environment. For this
reason researchers must have access early in the develop-
ment process to realistic large-scale corpora.
Forensic researchers and tool developers need to hold
themselves to a level of scientific testing and reproducibility
that is worthy of the word “forensic.” New detection algo-
rithms should be reported with a measurable error rate-
dideally with both false positive and true positive rates
reported. Many algorithms support one or more tunable
parameters. In these cases the algorithms should be pre-
sented with receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves
graphing the true positive rate against the false positive rate
(Fig. 1) for a variety of parameter settings. Finally, consistent
with the US Supreme Court’s Daubert ruling (Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 1993), the research
community should work to develop digital forensic tech-
niques that produce reportable rates for error or certainty
when they are run.
Sponsors, researcher advisers and reviewers need to insist
that new algorithms be tested with significant data setsd
larger than a few dozen documents chosen from the experi-
menter’s own system. To satisfy this requirement the DF
research community needs to create, maintain and use stan-
dardized forensic corpora (Lyle, 2008; Garfinkel et al., 2009).
4.5. Moving up the abstraction ladder
Given the ability to treat collections of data and metadata as
self-contained objects and to treat advanced forensic pro-
cessing across multiple drives and data streams as simple
function calls, researchers will be able to move up the
abstraction ladder. We will then be able to create a new
generation of forensic techniques, tools and procedures to
help address the coming digital forensic crisis. Specific
opportunities include:
4.5.1. Identity management
Given that the vast majority of the work in digital forensics
involves attributing results to individuals, we need
approaches for modeling individuals in a manner that is both
principled and computable. Such an abstraction would
include representations for simple data elements like names,
email addresses and identification numbers, but should also
extend to ways for formally representing a person’s knowl-
edge, capabilities and social network. Work in this area will
allow for improved Internet search, identity resolution and
disambiguation, and ultimately the creation of systems that
can identify likely suspects, appropriated accounts, and other
types of anomalies.
4.5.2. Data visualization and advanced user interfaces
Current tools use the standard WIMP model (window/icon/
menu/pointing device), which are poorly suited to presenting
large amounts of forensic data in an efficient and intuitive
way. Research is needed to develop and adopt new
approaches to visualizing and presenting forensic targets.
4.5.3. Visual analytics
Next-generation forensic tools need to integrate interactive
visualization with automated analysis techniques, which will
present data in new ways and allow investigators to interac-
tively guide the investigation.
4.5.4. Collaboration
Since forensics is increasingly team effort, forensic tools need
to support collaboration as a first class function. Additionally,
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Fig. 1 e A receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve for
a forensic recognition experiment, showing how the true
and false positive rates change when a set of tuning
parameters are adjusted. This experiment attempted to
distinguish random from compressed data by comparing
the histograms of a block of data with the histogram of the
autocorrelated block of data. The parameter FS (“First
Slope”) is the difference between the count of the most
common element and the second-to-most common
element. MCO is the Maximum Correlation Offset. SD is the
Slope Difference between two autocorrelation tests. This
visualization made it clear that the differentiation
approach, while successful, presented an unacceptably
high false positive rate and that the rate would not come
down by adjusting the parameters. Ultimately a modified
autocorrelation approach was followed and is presented in
(DFRWS, 2010).
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new collaboration modes need to be discovered and imple-
mented so that users can collaborate in real time, asynchro-
nously, remotely and even on disconnected networks.
4.5.5. Autonomous operation
New, advanced systems should be able to reason with and
about forensic information in much the same way that
analysts do today. Programs should be able to detect and
present outliers and other data elements that seem out-of-
place. These systems will be able to construct detailed base-
lines that are more than simply a list of registry entries and
hash codes for resident files.
Realistically, the only way that DF researchers and practi-
tioners can cope with the challenges posed by the increasing
diversity and size of forensic collections is to create more
powerful abstractions that allow for the easier manipulation
of data and the composition of forensic processing elements.
5. Conclusion
This paper predicts an impending crisis in digital forensics
given a continuation of current trends that have been identi-
fied by many observers. But whereas other papers looking at
the future of forensics have focused on specific tactical
capabilities that need to be developed, this paper discusses
the need to make digital forensics research more efficient
through the creation of new abstractions for data represen-
tation forensic processing.
Given the diversity of the research and vendor commu-
nities, the development of these abstractions will not be
sufficient to assure their success. Funding agencies will need
to adopt standards and procedures that use these abstrac-
tions for the testing and validation of research products, and
customers will need to demand that these abstractions be
implemented in tomorrow’s tools. With careful attention to
cooperation, standardization, and shared development, the
digital forensics research community can simultaneously
lower development costs and improve the quality of our
research efforts. This is probably one of the few techniques
at our disposal for surviving the coming crisis in digital
forensics.
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